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Despite all their apparent diversity and difference, most successful television formats1
are very similar. They offer a very limited palette of audience pleasures2 by
concentrating, for the most part, on entertainment rather than information or
education. Formats are about fun. Moreover, formats promote a particular kind of fun.
This chapter argues that, by promoting audience pleasures based in the pursuit of
individual and materialistic goals, most television formats are consonant with a
dominant orthodoxy which sees markets as the only way to organise society3. This
elective affinity between format pleasures and free market ideology, however, does
not come about through any deliberate design. Rather it is an unintended consequence
of television production’s response to economic and practical necessity. In their form,
content and production practices formats are pre-adapted to the demands of a
globalised media market place. As we will see here, this peculiar commercial logic
has given formats a peculiar signature in terms of what they can and cannot represent.

1

It should be noted that despite the common usage of the term, format television is so varied that the
term ‘format’ itself is difficult to succinctly explain or define.
(See Moran 2004: 6)
2
For a broader discussion of television pleasures see Brown 1994: 168–9; Tulloch 2000: 61–9; Fiske
1987: 314–5; see Philo and Miller 2001.
3
For an account of reality television as the ‘secret theatre of neoliberalism’ see Couldry 2006.

1

Form, Content and the Global Media Field
Before exploring these issues, it is necessary to understand format television’s current
prominence. Format production takes place not only at the micro level of studio
operations and production decisions but also, simultaneously, as part of a complex
global media environment. The rise of the format has taken place in step with the
transformation of, what can be called, the global media field. This describes the
broader system of political, economic, technological, and social processes in which
television production is embedded. To gain a conceptual perspective on such a
system, a model is required which transcends traditional dichotomies between macro
and micro, the objective and the subjective. Bourdieu provides one such conceptual
model, which allows us to understand how long-term, international processes may
interact with small-scale, everyday activity in cultural production (see Wacquant
1992; Fowler 1997: 2). This merging of national and international perspectives is
essential to understanding format television, which, despite its recent prevalence, is
the product of long-term social transformation.
In the past 30 years, what had been largely discrete national media systems
have given way to open global trade in media products. As Iosifidis et al. note in this
new ‘more competitive and fragmented broadcasting environment’ formats make
commercial sense. They ‘provide a cost-effective way of filling schedules with
localised productions which proved more popular than imported films and series’
(Iosifidis et al. 2005: 148). Since the 1970s, an austere economic climate has emerged
shaping the development and production of television programming4. In this
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(For a fuller discussion see Schiller 1971; Herman and McChesney 1997).
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transformed media environment, to be succesfully produced, programmes must be
cheap, reliable and popular.
Employing Bourdieu’s work on cultural production, Simon Cottle has
described changes in media production in terms of ‘media ecology’. He describes
how, as the ‘ecosystem’ in which television is produced has been transformed, the
form and content of programmes have changed also. Cottle elaborates on how
programme form and content are shaped by this new environment. He cites the
example of wildlife television, which has been transformed by ‘new technologies’,
‘heightened competitiveness, industrial centralization’ and ‘internationalizing
markets’ (2004: 82). Slow, in-depth programmes have been replaced by fast-paced,
action-based shows (2004: 93). In-depth wildlife programmes have been replaced by
shows that aim to maintain audience attention through a succession of animal
predation sequences. Similar changes can be found across programmes such as news,
current affairs and drama. As Siune and Hultén point out ‘the important changes are
not to be found at the macro level of output but within different genres: news becomes
sensational, current affairs becomes infotainment and talk shows, drama becomes
soap opera’ (1998: 29). Within and across genres, the detailed, the slow and the
serious has tended to give way to fast-paced, superficial fun. In today’s austere
broadcasting landscape certain genres have died out while others have become
dominant. Formats, with some other popular, low-cost genres like soap opera and
sport, have found their ecological niche. They have thrived in recent years because
they are pre-adapted to a commercialised, global media field (see Moran 2004; Moran
2006; Iosifadis et al. 2005; Waisbord 2004).

3

Format Production and Competing Visions of the Good Life
Television production, as part of general cultural production, is predominantly carried
out by what Bourdieu terms the ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’ (1993:
38). This describes a ‘cultural middle class’ comprised of artists, writers, teachers,
television producers and so on. Bourdieu sees cultural production as the site of a class
struggle between the ‘dominant and dominated fractions of the dominant class’ (1993:
378). Or, in other words, there is a conflict between the top and bottom of the middle
class. Members of the dominant fraction are, generally, producers of material wealth
through commerce or industry. The dominated fraction, on the other hand, produces
culture. In this conflict, cultural producers try to undermine the dominant fraction of
their class by ‘decrying wealth, which they lack, and extolling the virtues of culture,
in which they abound’ (Brennan 2000: 2). Bourdieu sees this conflict as a struggle to
‘impose the dominant principle of domination’ or ultimately ‘the definition of human
accomplishment’ (Bourdieu 1993: 41). It is a conflict between two opposing visions
of happiness or the ‘good life’. In one, happiness is synonymous with building
material wealth, through money and property. In the other, the good life is built
through the accumulation of cultural knowledge and associated prestige. Bourdieu
describes these positions as heteronomous and autonomous principles of
hierarchisation respectively (Bourdieu 1993: 40). In the first, reward is material and
extrinsic to the individual5. Under the autonomous principles of cultural production
reward is immaterial and more intrinsic.
The field of cultural production then contains two opposing sets of rules and
rewards. The rules and rewards that originate in the field of cultural production see
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Kasser et al. describe extrinsic goals as ‘those focused on exterrnal rewards and other people’s praise,
and include striving for financial success’ (2007: 7).
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cultural producers competing to gain respect and notoriety among their peers (see
Bourdieu 1985: 731). The main tools they can use to achieve this are knowledge and
skills peculiar to their field (see Bourdieu 1986: 243). Contrary to these ‘purist’
positions is a set of rules and rewards that originates in the marketplace. These are
essentially the prizes of popularity and wealth. Cultural ‘purists’ shun these rewards
(see Bourdieu 1993: 38–40). Format television, however, is not for purists.

Economic and Cultural Orthodoxy
In much the same way as the former social-democratic hegemony was
maintained with different emphases and priorities by previous governments of
both Left and Right, the new neo-liberal hegemony is now actively being
pursued with different emphases and priorities by governments of both Right
and Left (O’Donnell 1999: 15).
Market-centred orthodoxy has come to dominate global politics to the extent that it
now constitutes a new ‘common sense’ (Harvey 2005: 39) In 1996, Herman and
McChesney report, Forbes magazine ‘exulted’ in the fact that the world’s
governments whether they were left or right ‘could no longer “interfere” with the
prerogatives of business without suffering an economic punishment that would bring
them down’. Governments, the magazine reported, had ‘effectively lost their power to
govern’ (1997: 32). Mass media are caught up in a corporate drive to boost the global
role of markets in allocating goods and services, to diminish the role of governments
and generally, to further the ‘commodification of everything’ (Harvey 2005: 165—6).
In keeping with this general trend, the global media field has become
predominantly privatized and commercial. Moran identifies an ‘increasing shift
towards facilitating private sectoral interests in television’ with ‘state-controlled’ and
‘public-service television’ frequently being ‘reallocated to private entrepreneurial
interests’ (Moran 2006: 3). Despite their importance to citizenship and democracy,
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mass media are increasingly treated like any other type of commodity (see Corcoran
2002: 2; Herman and McChesney 1997).
It could be argued that public service broadcasters have escaped this
colonisation by market principles. Public broadcasters, however, have been weakened
in terms of their audience numbers, their prestige and their autonomy. Most now
operate according to a quasi-commercial logic. While the BBC, for example, may not
sell advertising to British audiences it is nevertheless under political pressure to
deliver low cost programmes to large audiences. It may otherwise face charges of
wastefulness and a failure to deliver on a public service mandate. More significantly,
persistent misdemeanours in this regard are likely to lead to budget cuts (see
Buckingham 1987: 2–3; Born 2004: 113). As a result, among both public and
commercial broadcasters, ‘good television’ is broadly synonymous with ‘popular
television’. A model of ‘good television’ where audience and revenue figures
supersede concerns with quality, prestige or critical acclaim is now in the ascendant.
The rules and rewards of the market dominate. Formats have risen to prominence in a
system where ‘purist’ positions are economically untenable, culturally negligible and,
increasingly, unthinkable.
The general commercialisation of cultural production has seen an attack on
‘purist’ positions, which are cast as paternalistic, intransigent and elitist. By attacking
cultural ‘élites’ and thus attempting to dissolve cultural hierarchies, the dominant
fraction of the dominant class moves closer to what Bourdieu sees as its goal, the
creation of a single, monetary hierarchy (Bourdieu 1993: 41). Thus, the endless
variety of different social games collapses into a single goal, where the only
remaining model of achievement, happiness and the ‘good life’ is one based on
extrinsic validation through wealth, fame and power (see Kasser et al. 2007).

6

This colonisation of cultural production is consequential for producers, their
occupational culture and the content of the programmes they create. In their work
television producers depend in large part on instincts or hunches (Gitlin 1983: 26–27).
These learned ‘instincts’ in turn depend on a shared but often unspoken professional
culture which is the product of similar conditions of employment and movement in
the same social circles (see Elliott 1972: 159; Cantor and Cantor 1992: 96; Pekurny
1982: 136–7; Alvarado and Buscombe 1978: 251; Schultz 2007). As the global media
system has changed so have producers’ employment conditions. Most importantly in
the case of format television, production work and supporting social networks have
been abstracted from national contexts to become trasnsnational.
According to Moran (2006) and Waisbord (2004), the global media system,
now contains a transnational global media élite who share similar working conditions
and professional aims. Waisbord claims that there is a ‘growing homogenization of
the professional sensibilities among television executives worldwide’ (2004: 379).
This shared occupational culture is supported through trade publications, and formal
and informal networks (Moran 2006; Waisbord 2004).
Attendance at annual trade meetings, exposure to the same trade publications,
and regular electronic communications have helped maintain frequent
interpersonal contacts that facilitate familiarity with global trends… These
meetings are places for cultivating a similar business mindset among industry
executives (Waisbord 2004: 365).
Sharing similar concerns and working conditions, these producers develop a similar
sense of what constitutes good format television. There is a loose, fuzzy but, more or
less, coherent sense of what constitutes a ‘good’ format6. Waisbord sees that
‘globalization has nurtured the formation of a cosmopolitian class of industry
6

This can be described using Bourdieu’s concept of habitus which describes a lasting, general and
adaptable way of thinking that shapes the way we read, understand, and react to the world around us
(Bourdieu 1984: 170; see Inglis 1998: 11).
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professionals who, from New York to New Delhi, increasingly share similar concepts
and attitudes about “what works” and “what doesn’t” in commercial television’
(2004: 364). Of course, this shared sense of ‘what works’ is equally prevalent among
beleagured public service broadcasters. Formats then, in addition to being an
economic necessity have become an accepted part of producer culture. Rather than
being subjectively experienced as a product of the ‘dull compulsion of the economic’
(Abercrombie, Turner and Hill 1980: 57) many producers now see formats as an
obvious and common sense way of making good television.
Formats as Technologies of Reproduction
Although the term is commonly used and understood, it is actually difficult to offer a
precise definition of what a format is. Moran argues, however, that to ask what a
format is, is miss the point. ‘Such a queston implies that a format has some core or
essence’ rather than being ‘a loose term that covers a range of items that may be
included in a format licensing agreement’ (Moran 2004: 6). The term is significant
‘not so much because of what it is but because of what it permits or facilitates’. In an
increasingly liberalised media system ‘flows’ in global media trade have extended
beyond ‘finished televison programmes to include television-related knowledge,
services and so on’. There is a trade in ‘ tangible and non-tangible elements across
borders’ that includes ‘finance, advertising, programming, scheduling practices,
management outlooks and marketing strategies’ (Moran 2006: 3). As an amalgam of
such services and forms of knowledge, television formats are a global media product
par excellence. The important function and effect of a format is that it is ‘an economic
and cultural technology of exchange’ (Moran 2004: 6). Thus, ‘a format is a cultural
technology which governs the flow of programme ideas across time and space’
(Moran 2004: 8).

8

Conceiving of formats as a technology allows us to see how, in their form and
content, they may be related to the media ‘ecosystem’ that has shaped them. Sterne
identifies technologies as a way in which cultures and social systems may be
embodied and thus perpetuated (see also Law 1991, Latour 1991, Elias 1986 and Lee
1997).
Technologies are associated with habits and practices, sometimes crystallizing
them and sometimes promoting them. They are structured by human practices
so that they may in turn structure human practices. They embody in physical
form particular dispositions and tendencies—particular ways of doing things
(Sterne 2003: 377).
Clearly, formats carry meanings across the globe. Yet, these meanings are necessarily
divorced from national culture. For Waisbord, they are ‘culturally specific but
nationally neutral’. The ‘DNA’ of format televison is ‘rooted in cultural values that
transcend the national (2004: 368). The values, which have shaped format television’s
‘DNA’ are, of course, the heteronomous principles which currently dominate the
global media field. It can be posited then, following Sterne, that this system’s culture,
practical pressures and values have been inscribed within format television as a
cultural technology.
Certain ground rules apply in the production and sale of format television. The
conception of programme concepts is confined to companies, such as Endemol or
Fremantle Media, who create, licence and sell formats. Outside of this programmes
are merely manufactured following these companies’ instructions, which are
delivered through a production ‘bible’ and on-site consultancy. The format sales
model depends on a degree of national variation without any fundamental tampering
with the structure of the format. As a cultural technology format television encourages
the faithful reproduction of programme form, content and production practices. Thus,
following Sterne, formats sell more than programme concepts. They export
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‘dispositions’, ‘tendencies’ and ‘particular ways of doing things’ that have their roots
in a market orientation to cultural production (2003: 377).
Colonisation without Imperialism?
Many past studies addressing global flows in programming have seen the dominance
of particular countries as a form of cultural imperialism (Tunstall 1977: Tunstall and
Machin 1999). Such a model cannot hold, however, when studying television formats
because, of course, they deliberately strip out most of the trappings of their culture of
origin. Iwabuchi claims that ‘it is now untenable to single out an absolute symbolic
centre that belongs to a particular country or region’. The prevalence of format
television ‘shows that the global cultural power alignment is highly dispersed and
decentred’ and ‘origins become subsumed by local transculturation processes’
(Iwabuchi 2004: 33). It would appear that, in a global system of open trade in media,
media imperialism is a waning concern. Many commentators have rejected the media
imperialism thesis on theoretical and normative grounds (Chadha and Kavoori 2000:
416). Moreover, Chadha and Kavoori contend, the proposition that media systems in
developing economies are dominated by western media content has been undermined
by a number of practical developments. While transnational media organizations play
an undeniable and occasionally aggressive role ‘their domination is restricted by the
interplay of national gate-keeping policies, the dynamics of audience preference as
well as the forces of local competiton (Chadha and Kavoori 2000: 428).
In addition to market and regulatory checks, format television can be argued to
further reduce tendencies towards media imperialism. Offering a global and, more or
less, standardised business model, formats can be adjusted to the tastes and customs
of local settings. Iosifidis et al. argue that ‘the growth in format sales and local
production reinforces the notion that the most successful trade in cultural products
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involves the suppression of the look and feel of programming concepts which express
national origins’ (Iosifidis et al. 2005: 148; see also Iwabuchi 2004: 29). Formats,
Waisbord argues, are ‘de-territorialized’ without any ‘national home’. Thus, they
‘represent the disconnection between culture, geography, and social spaces that
characterizes globalization’. Traces of national origin are deliberately removed so
‘domestic producers can incorporate local color’. Thus ‘global audiences can
paradoxically feel at home when watching them’ (2004: 378).
Despite such checks on unbridled cultural imperialism Chadha and Kavoori
note that there is no ‘room for complacency’. Commenting on Asian media, they
write that while various processes have reduced the importation of foreign
programming in many territories, commercialisation has become the dominant
organising principle (2000: 428). As demonstrated by Cottle’s model of media
ecology, this almost universal move from citizen to consumer oriented media has had
traceable consequences for the nature and diversity of cultural production (see Cottle
2004) . There is an increased volume of indigenous production with more programme
titles being broadcast on a growing number of channels. There is also a pronounced
increase in entertainment programming. However, behind these changes, Chadha and
Kavoori argue, programme diversity has actually decreased.
Even in the case of entertainment oriented programs while there is
considerable plurality in numerical terms, and this is often touted as a ‘sign of
enhanced choice’, the apparent abundance is quite limited, with successful
programming being based largely on the cloning of successful genres and
formats – as a result there is little genuine diversity in much of the
programming, except the fact that it is local rather than imported in nature
(Chadha and Kavoori 2000: 429).
The media imperialism thesis may be irrelevant to understanding the politics of
format pleasures. Worse yet, any concern with conflicting ‘national’ cultures, whether
positive or negative in its outlook, may actually obfuscate a political understanding of
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format pleasures. National markets are not being over-whelmed by cheap cultural
imports. There are, however, other equally serious causes for concern. A consumer
orientation in programming may be leading to an over-dependence on entertainment.
A reliance on formats as a ‘tried and trusted’ cultural technology may encourage
cultural homogenisation. Ultimately, more citizen-oriented programming may be
displaced leading to a public sphere that is filled with spectacle and evacuated of
political content. The key point here is that these processes are not imposed from
outside. Instead, they arise spontaneously from the practical pressures that prevail in a
commercialised global media field.
Exemplary Formats, their Pressures and their Pleasures
To be successful a format must be able to travel internationally, generating as many
localised versions as possible. At the same time, the fundamental structure of the
show must remain coherent. And, of course, there is constant pressure to deliver large
audiences at the lowest possible cost. These conditions pose a number of fundamental
expressive limitations on both the form and the content of a programme format. It is
these practical constraints, rather than producers’ attempts to indoctrinate, which
orient format pleasures towards the rules and rewards of the market7.

7

To explore the dominant characteristics of format television, twenty programmes that could be
considered to be exemplary formats were selected (see table 1). These were selected primarily on the
basis of international format sales. However, the selection was also informed by other considerations.
Formats were also included on the basis of:
1. Having won recognition and notoriety through industry awards
2. Being an example of counter-flow, selling a format from the media periphery to
traditionally dominant countries
3. Being a long running format (over five years)
4. Having been deemed valuable enough to be the subject of legal dispute (see Appendix,
Table 2)

12

Visual Medium and Extrinsic Message
Arguably, as a visual medium, television may be predisposed to representations of the
‘good life’ that are more in sympathy with heteronomous rather than purist principles.
It is more suited to displaying extrinsic rather than intrinsic rewards. As such, when
displaying people and characters it is not well suited to dealing with unspoken
thoughts and feelings. Iwabuchi provides a telling example in the Japanese version of
Survivor. The show’s Japanese producers decided to concentrate on contestants’ inner
battles rather than interpersonal rivalries. This proved disastrous. It was impossible to
mediate such inner processes though the reality format. The show’s Japanese
producer saw that it failed because:
The depiction of contestant emotions is much too intricate to be easily
portrayed and understood… the emphasis on a search for the true self did not
result in unexpected or exciting interpersonal relationships such as love affairs
among contestants that are a significant element of international versions
(cited in Iwabuchi 2004: 25).
Television can, of course, deal with inner life through drama productions, for
example. In pared-down format productions, however, television is best suited to
communicating activities that provide a level of visual spectacle. Thus, format
television is more suited to portraying rewards that are tangible rather than intangible
and goal orientations that are extrinsic rather than intrinsic. Beauty, fame, and the
trappings of wealth and power can be readily represented through low budget
television. Inner peace, knowledge and self-esteem may be laudable goals but they do
not easily, or cheaply, translate into emotive, dramatic or marketable television. As
low-cost, visual media, formats are already pre-disposed to representations of the
‘good life’ as it is seen by the dominant fraction of the dominant class.
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Time, Timeliness and Hermetically Sealed Formats
In television production, time is money. Equipment and locations must be rented by
the day. More significantly, technicians, camera crews, production staff and so on
must be paid by the hour. Most formats avoid the need to pay cast members or
writers. Nevertheless, costs need to be controlled by working as quickly as possible.
This requires a rationalised and routine approach to production. In many cases studiobased format shows such as The Weakest Link, Who Wants to be a Millionaire and
Are You Smarter than A Fifth Grader will shoot several episodes in quick succession
on a single day. Thus costs are minimised. A consequence of this, however, is that
such shows are practically incapable of being timely. That is, they can make no direct
reference to ongoing public events or current affairs. They are effectively selfcontained and sealed off from the world around them by their production regime.
Unlike batch productions, some shows may be shot over an extended period.
Programmes like Survivor and Wife Swap may be shot over several days or weeks.
However, these productions face the same problem of timeliness. They tend to feature
location shoots, occasionally in exotic settings. To maximise such an investment trade
will often take place in finished programmes as well as formats. Shows like Survivor,
Wife Swap, and Queer Eye for the Straight Guy have all been exported as finished
programmes as well as being traded as formats. Here timeliness is equally impossible
because these programmes, in order to travel through space, must also be able to
travel through time. Put simply, a programme which is intended for export as a
finished product cannot make references to football games, political campaigns or
social crises that will be meaningless and out of date six months after its initial
transmission. Thus while their production cycle may be longer than short run batch
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productions they are, for similarly practical reasons, equally incapable of making
reference to anything outside the show’s basic formula.
Many format shows are effectively live. Big Brother is a prominent example.
While the show appears as edited highlights on a daily and weekly basis, it is also
made available 24 hours a day through television and the internet. Ironically, in this
example, despite the live nature of the show, external reference is impossible. Big
Brother places its contestants under constant surveillance. The contestants, however,
are isolated from all news of the outside world. Once again references within the
show are confined to the bounds of the show itself8.
Seventeen of the twenty programmes addressed here were incapable of
making external references, preventing the inclusion of political or social themes9. It
should be noted here that the absence of timeliness is not, of course, confined to
television formats. Many other genres such as television drama for example are
equally incapable of representing up to the minute social concerns. However, beyond
television’s usual temporal limitations, formats are more completely isolated from the
world in which their audience live. Even soap operas, with their industrialised
production processes commonly make reference to social and political issues
(Livingstone 1988: 56). However, while they may travel, most soap operas are not
made with a deliberate view to export. Formats, on the other hand, are. As we have

8

It is notable that when British independent politician, George Galloway took part in Britain’s
Celebrity Big Brother in 2006 his attempts to discuss Britain’s participation in the war in Iraq were
drowned out by birdsong and engine noise (see The Guardian January 16 2006). In this case, the
blending of external issues and entertainment were certainly not seen to be conducive to the delivery of
good format television.
9
There are, however, some notable exceptions. Shows that are shot on a weekly basis such as Got
Talent and Idol may potentially include timely references to external events. Thus unlike batch
productions and expensive long shoots they may include broader social themes that lie outside the
immediate concern of the programme. Shahaf provides an extreme example of this in the case of
Kohav Nolad, the Israeli version of the Idol franchise. During the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict the
show not only referred to ongoing events but also changed its basic form and location in response
(http://flowtv.org/?p=24: accessed January 12 2008).
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seen above, the inclusion of national specificity stands in the way of the format trade.
The inclusion of social and political issues from a national context risks corrupting the
production and enjoyment of a reliable, low-risk format. Formats then could be
compared to a computer operating system where the particular look, colour and sound
can be customized. The fundamental software, however, remains sealed and cannot be
tampered with. This leads to a situation where audience engagement and pleasure
must be generated entirely within the confines of the show itself without reference to
external concerns.

Formats’ Emotional Flavours
To permit international sales, the themes at the core of any format must be as
universally attractive as possible. Thus format programmes are more likely to appeal
to basic emotions rather than to stimulate questions, discussion or debate. As van
Zoonen notes, shows such as Big Brother, and hundreds of other formats are built on
‘primal experiences and emotions’ or the ‘basic instincts’ of ‘ordinary people’ (2001:
670).
As noted, television is a visual medium. It is also an emotional medium. As
Freeth argues ‘television is not at heart an information medium’. When television
works, ‘it works below the belt’. The medium is ‘best at communicating atmospheres
and attitudes, personalities, motivations, hopes and fears, and the broader political and
cultural significance of things’ (1994: 166). The emotive nature of television does not
necessarily constrain its expressive range. Television can cause emotional arousal in
any number of ways. Drama, news and documentary can all be emotionally engaging
while dealing with social or political themes. However, due to their hermetically
sealed nature, most formats must be able to excite the emotions without reference to
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any broader context. Rather than creating excitement, anger or satisfaction by linking
a programme to political or social issues the emotional charge of format television
must be built using the devices and people available within the programme itself.
Not only must audience engagement be created from within the confines of
the format, it must also happen rapidly. In a multi-channel environment, where
viewers make programme choices via remote control in a matter of seconds, it is
essential to ‘hook’ the audience as quickly as possible. There is no such thing as a
slow-burning format that only becomes rewarding after persistent viewing. In a media
ecology that is intolerant of risk such an approach is practically impossible and
unlikely to be considered as a programming possibility. This need to give audiences a
quick return for their attention also helps to explain the individualistic nature of most
formats. The formats addressed here concentrate disproportionately on the individual,
rather than the family, community or broader group, as the locus of action (see table
1). In this respect, they are in harmony with the individualist ethos of market
orthodoxy. The individualist nature of format television, however, may again owe
more to practical constraints than ideology. There is a fundamental difficulty in
developing a format around collective representation and participation. Audience
identification with a media character depends on recognisable social types and a
viewer’s ability to understand the character through the lens of their own personal
experience (see Cohen 2006: 185). People can identify readily with the emotional
predicaments of other individuals, typically conveyed through visual cues. However,
audience identification with a heterogeneous group or team is unlikely to occur as
readily. Understandably then, in the pursuit of viewing figures and economic survival,
formats are more likely to gravitate towards the representation of individuals at the
centre of the action.
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Furthermore, the individualistic nature of format programmes may provide
pleasures by serving psychological needs that arise from the individualised nature of
modern societies. Many format programmes, like Big Brother and Wife Swap for
example, offer pleasures of surveillance and vicarious living. Audience members can
look into the lives of others for comparisons with their own lifestyle. This need to
compare one’s own life and habits with others is a product of the privatisation of
family life (Habermas 1989: 45). This is visible in the eighteenth century in the birth
of melodrama, which accompanied the separation of work and family life. Here,
among the middle classes, a new isolated sense of self was created, unsupported by
public life and lacking a stable, taken-for-granted world view. This persists today,
creating a psychological need for reflection and validation through social comparison.
There is a need to establish and reinforce visions of how life should be lived. Two
hundred years ago, this was done, largely, by looking into other people’s private lives
through the medium of literature (see Habermas 1989: 45; van Zoonen 2001: 670).
Today manifestations of the same need for social comparison can be found in
television formats.
Social comparison also underpins the way in which shows such as Big
Brother, The Weakest Link, Idol and Are You Smarter than a Fifth Grader depend
schadenfreude as a key emotional ingredient (see Wong 2001). This German term
refers to pleasure taken in the misfortune of others. This sentiment is commonplace in
format television. A former BBC producer described to Raymond Boyle how, to
attract a young audience and avoid boring them, ‘you need humiliation to some
extent, to see people suffer’ (Michelle Kurland cite in Boyle 2008: 419). Like
vicarious living, this negative form of social comparison among privatised individuals
may psychologically validate one’s lifestyle and sense of self (Trepte 2006: 258).
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Formats may project the individual as the locus of action. In this, however, they are
also reflecting the lifestyles of western audiences.
In the small sample of exemplary formats examined here the preponderance
are based on individual competition and extrinsic goal orientation. Indeed a number of
shows are based on games where the winner takes all. These include Big Brother,
Idol, I’m a Celebrity Get Me Out Of Here, Survivor and The Weakest Link. Many
shows are based on games that generate distrust, subterfuge and a Machiavellian
approach to life. These include Big Brother, The Mole, Survivor and The Weakest
Link. Such social pessimism could be interpreted as an ideological position. Curran
argues that some ‘seemingly apolitical material’ can embody ‘ethical codes or
expressive values that lie at the heart of political creeds’. He cites, for example,
‘egalitarianism, mutuality and a belief in human perfectibility in the case of traditional
social democracy, or possessive individualism, self-reliance and social pessimism in
the case of neo-liberal conservatism’ (Curran 1991: 34). Again, producers do not
include such ideas to indoctrinate. They are included because they are popular, easily
conveyed and economically viable10.
Overriding themes were identifiable in the form and content of the twenty
programmes addressed here. Notably, most of the shows were based on various kinds
of competitions. Only three of the programmes, Wife Swap, Queer Eye for the
Straight Guy and How to Look Good Naked could be considered to be noncompetitive, self-improvement programmes. More importantly, the twenty formats
analysed demonstrated a predisposition towards two central characteristics. Most
10

It would be unwise to condemn all format television as being socially negative. Shows such as How
Long will You Live or Honey We’re Killing the Kids may disrupt viewers’ sense of self around their
lifestyles and consumption habits. Such shows also provide informational resources to help people
change their diets, exercise regimes and so on. A small minority of television formats may provide
empowerment and education. It is notable, however, that such formats have not met with great
commercial success.
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were based in competition between individuals rather than teams. The main prizes on
offer, and, accordingly, the predominant goal orientations were extrinsic (see table 2).
That is, goals were ‘focused on external rewards and other people’s praise’, and
included ‘striving for financial success, as well as for image and status’ (Kasser et al.
2007: 7). As a cultural technology shaped by a commercialised media field, formats
reproduce the extrinsic goal orientation of Bourdieu’s ‘dominant fraction of the
dominant class’. In their representation of acquisitive, individual competition,
formats, for the most part, are structurally predisposed to represent a single, monetary
hierarchy as the dominant definition of human accomplishment.

Table 1: Programmes by Goal Orientation and Mode of Participation
Extrinsic Goal
Orientation

Individual Participation
Are You Smarter Than A
5th Grader?

Collective Participation
Got Talent
The Lyrics Board

Big Brother
Dragon’s Den
Idol
I’m A Celebrity Get Me
Out Of Here!
Next Top Model
Thank God You’re Here
The Mole
The Singing Bee
The Swan
Queer Eye for the Straight
Guy
Survivor
The Weakest Link
The X Factor
Who Wants to be a
Millionaire?
Wife Swap
Intrinsic Goal
Orientation

How to Look Good Naked

Test the Nation / National
IQ Test
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Formats and the Fun Side of Market Orthodoxy
The global media are the missionaries of our age, promoting the virtues of
commercialism and the market loudly and incessantly through their profit
driven and advertising-supported enterprises and programming.
This
missionary work is not the result of any sort of conspiracy; for the global
media TNC’s it developed organically from their institutional basis and
commercial imperatives (Herman and McChesney 1997: 37–8).
Herman and McChesney contend that the stability of the global corporate system as it
currently exists depends 'to no small extent' on the 'widespread acceptance of a global
corporate ideology' (1997: 34). This ideology essentially legitimates the primacy of
the market, the roll-back of the State and the conflation of ‘freedom’ with economic
freedom (See Herman and McChesney 1997: 34). I am not concerned here, however,
with the ‘ideology’ of format television in the sense of a set of codified ideas about
how society should be managed. My concern lies with the ‘pleasures’ that format
television may offer. I am arguing that format television offers a particular, and quite
limited, set of pleasures that are rooted in the culture and practical pressures of a
commercialised, global media field. Format television programmes are not, therefore,
concerned with explicitly legitimating grand schemes or ideologies. Nonetheless,
most format television subtly tells individuals about what is of value in the pursuit of
happiness and the ‘good life’.
As O’Donnell writes, one of the most potent aspects of the ideology of the
new broadcasting environment is the fact that it is ‘commonsense’, populist and even
fun (O’Donnell 1999: 15; see also Humphreys 1996: 229). The seduction of the
commercialised global media field lies in the fact that, while it enriches corporate
elites, it creates popular appeal by attacking cultural hierarchies and, ostensibly,
offering greater personal choice. O’Donnell identifies commercial television
entertainment as a focal point for this populist strand of market orthodoxy. As a
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result, O’Donnell writes, proponents of a market-led society have appropriated
notions of ‘fun’ and ‘glamour’ as their own. This, he claims, is ‘one of the greatest
ideological steals of recent times’ (1999: 15).
For clear pragmatic reasons, low-cost entertainment is an increasingly
important part of the world media system. Facing harsh ‘economic realities’
commercial broadcasters ‘had every reason to rely upon the kind of programming that
was most likely to maximise audience and that was at the same time relatively
inexpensive’ (Humphreys 1996: 230). Television today is ‘increasingly and mainly a
medium for entertainment’ (De Bens and de Smaele 2001: 72). The massive increase
in commercial channels in combination with ‘light touch’ regulation has seen these
new broadcasters concentrate on entertainment to the increasing exclusion of
informational, educational and political programming (Brants and Siune 1998: 133).
At an explicit, and institutionally political level, market orthodoxy is a codified
ideology. At the personal level, however, codified ideology can be left aside in favour
of fun. In the case of format television, however, this is a particular flavour of fun,
where the path to happiness lies in the individual pursuit of money, power and fame.
There is, of course, no intention to be a killjoy here. Entertainment is an
essential part of any media system. Moreover, television entertainment can provide an
essential means of conveying information and education, particularly to illiterate or
less educated populations (Livingstone 1988: 73; Nariman 1993; Elkamel 1995;
Singhal and Rogers 1999; Goldsmiths Media Group 2000: 44). Television
entertainment can be highly political (Curran 1991: 33—34). The politics of marketled format entertainment, however, lie, in part, in the necessary absence of explicit
politics. More importantly, however, they lie in the implicit celebration of liberalindividualist, utilitarian values. As Inglis notes, liberal-individualism ‘holds the world
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capitalist system together’. It is ‘the unquestioned orthodoxy of global culture’
transforming all ‘locals into cosmopolitans’ (Inglis 2008: 257). Through the
propagation of these values under-developed countries ‘become the same as their
Western counterparts in their immersion in the material world, their pursuit of
pleasure, quest for excitement, fulfilment of desire, obsession with consuming, and
obsession with self’ (Inglis 2008: 190)11. As noted above, the decline of nationalist
cultural imperialism does not preclude the colonisation of national cultures by a
stateless orthodoxy (see Chadha and Kavoori 2000).
At an institutional level the acceptance of explicit market ideology is essential
to the maintenance of the currently dominant economic paradigm. At a personal level,
the continuation of a tacit and unquestioned orthodoxy is equally important. As Inglis
notes:
If people become happy consuming less, there is the threat of economic
depression. If people stop believing in the need to earn more to spend more,
there is a danger the golden egg of world trade and globalization might
become just a thin shell with no yolk to sustain it (Inglis 2008: 190).
It is through the personal acceptance of individual and utilitarian ideas that ‘the way
of the market becomes the way of the world’ (see Inglis 2008: 162). Unlike, codified
ideology, which is open to discussion and debate, the ideals of today’s market-led
society can also be experienced, on a personal level, as a set of vague feelings,
motivations and goal orientations (Kasser et al. 2007).
By their nature, television formats are visually led. To maximise returns on
investment they are low-cost and low-risk. As a technology of exchange, export sales
are central to what a format does. The need to attract numerous national audiences,
while preserving format coherence, leads to isolation from local social and political
concerns. To survive formats must appeal to values and norms that are as widespread
11

In this case, Inglis is referring to the development of liberal consumer capitalism in Ireland.
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as possible. Thus dominant formats project and reflect individualist values and
extrinsic goal orientations. Format pleasures are circumscribed by the practical
constraints of a commercialised media field. Ironically, the same constraints inscribe
the norms and values of market orthodoxy within formats’ ostensibly apolitical brand
of fun.
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Appendix, Table 2: Exemplary Formats12
Name of
format

Format Type

Are You
Smarter
Than A 5th
Grader?
Big Brother
Dragons’
Den
Got Talent
How to Look
Good Naked
Idol
I’m A
Celebrity Get
Me Out Of
Here!
Next Top
Model
Test the
Nation /
National IQ
Test
Thank God
You’re Here
The Mole

Game show

34

Reality
Reality/business

39
8

Talent show
Reality/makeover

16
2

Talent show
Reality /
celebrity
adventure

30
5

Reality /
modelling
Game show /
quiz

32

Acting

16

Game show /
adventure
Game show /
music lyrics
Reality / extreme
makeover

14

The Singing
Bee
The Swan

Queer Eye
for the
Straight Guy
Survivor
The Lyrics
Board
The Weakest
Link
X Factor
Who Wants
to be a
Millionaire
Wife Swap

12

Reality /
makeover

International
Versions

Industry
Award
Winner

Longevity Subject of
Legal
Dispute

40

22
2

8

Reality /
adventure
Game show /
music lyrics
Game show /

11

Talent show
Game show /

40
105

Reality / lifestyle

Contraflow

19
23

2

I am indebted to Anthony Quinn for his work identifying and presenting these exemplary formats.
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